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The relation between political and economic development is, on most
definitions of the problem, the key relation which underlies American
foreign aid programs. Since the end of the Second World War, almost
without exception, the ultimate objective of these programs, from UNRRA
to the Indian surplus food deal, has been not economic but political.
Much of the most cogent criticism of foreign aid centers around the
possibility that economic assistance may produce political results which
are neither democratic nor stable nor, in other respects, harmonious with
the American interest; and around the fact that we face many circumstan-
ces where economic aid, taken by itself, is evidently an inadequate
solution to the problems we confront.
So far as I am aware there is no definitive, generally accepted
answer to the question: what is the relation between economic and poli-
tical development. And the reason there is no answer is that our depart-
mentalized social sciences have not interested themselves in a systematic
way in the problem of how economic and political processes interact. On
the whole we tend to be much too Marxist in this area, accepting, consciously
or not, rather primitive links between economic and political development.
I wish to make it quite clear, however, that, while I am going to
present certain positive propositions today, I regard my own knowledge
in this field as ill-formed. I am caught up academicaaly in exactly the
same process of trying to learn that many of you are who handle desk
positions, where this problem is part of your living environment; and
the spirit of this talk is one of tentative exploration.
When Max Millikan and I wrote our memorandum on economic foreign
policy, we made the relationship between economic and political change
central to our thesis. Chapter 3 is designated "The Development of
Mature Democracies"; and there we try to lay out six potential com-
sequences in an underdeveloped society of the people's turning their
energies successfully to the process of economic growth. The six
consequences are these. First, the challenge of economic development
may help capture the imagination of leaders and an ever-widening
segment of the population, and thus serve as, a unifying constructive
outlet for the tremendous raw energy at work in the underdeveloped
areas. Second, a successful development effort tends to force unity
between classes, and as among the various regions of the country. Many
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of these societies are emerging from regional structures in which national
unity and a sense of community among classes was not present. In its
widest sense a successful economic development program can help produce
a better integrated society. The third thing a successful growth pro-
gram can do is to develop new young leadership, capable of carrying
forward a steadily modernizing society . Fourth, such a program can
increase social mobility, offering a widening range of possibilities
and choices for those whose previous horizons had been fixed at the
level of their class and caste. Fifth, and related to the mobility
question, a consistent economic development program can make a link--
often a decisive link for political stability--between the urban intelli-
gentsia and the peasantry. Sixth, and perhaps most important, a successful
economic development program can give the peoples of an underdeveloped
area confidence--confidence in a rather special sense. If you look at
what we now call "the revolution of expectations", it means in simplest
form that men are beginning to accept the proposition that it lies
within their own capabilities to alter their environment, to help shape
their own destinies. A great deal of the trouble in the underdeveloped
areas comes about when this level of expectations rises, but the con-
ditions have not been created to fulfill them. One of the consequences
of a successful economic development program is that a society can be
suffused not'merely with high expectations--because these alone can be
dangerous--but. with a sense that they can move forward by their own
efforts.
These are propositions about the potentials of a successful economic
development program which I would be prepared to defend from both historical
and contemporary experience. These are things which have happened in
many societies and can be made to happen. I don't think that either
Millikan or myself would be inclined to back away from anything that
we have said; but we are keenly aware that this is an incomplete statement
of the relation between political and economic development and that there
are a number of questions which we didn't pretend to answer, which, in
a sense, we begged in our Chapter 3. For example, if it is agreed that
these are six things economic success can do politically, what about the
following question: how can political structures frustrate economic
development? It is not necessary to look very far around the worLd,
in areas where the United States has interests and bears responsibility,
where we know that an inadeqqate political framework now blocks a successful
economic development program and blocks also the unfolding political
and social process summarized in the six factors. One might also ask
how economic aid, without an appropriate political framework can have
negative economic, social, and political consequences. And we do not
have to look far to discover this to be a real, not theoretical problem.
I plan later in this talk to return briefly to certain propositions
about American policy derived from the analysis I am presenting todaybut
before I do that, I shall try to get some kind of intellectual order into
this problem. I am going back to fundamentals. I am going to start by
describing my own conception of the three stages in which it is useful
to view economic growth; and then I shall try to relate the process of
political development to these three stages.
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Some of you who have read our memorandum on foreign aid may know
these three economic growth categories, and should some be interested in
examining the case for them, you may wish to read the article on the take-
off in the ECONOMIC JOURNAL for March of this year [1956].
My view is that the process of growth can' be viewed both historically
and in terms of contemporary societies as unfolding in three stages. The
first stage is that in which the preconditions for take-off are established.
Starting with a static, often feudal, agricultural society (like eighteenth
century Japan or Russia), what first happens is that a few men within the
society begin to get the idea that change is possible. This has come about
by different routes. Sometimes it is brought about (as in China) by the
impact of foreigners who wanted trade and were prepared to impose trade
on an' otherwise relatively stable and self-sufficient society. Colonial
rule has been, of course, a major route for imparting the sense that men
can, to a degree, control their environment. But sometimes the process
starts by casual knowledge of what is going on in the rest of the world
introduced by travel, missionaries, and so on.
One of the first things that is then likely to happen is what happened
in Ireland and China at the end of the seventeentli century: from this
contact with the world outside, some tricks of easy increase in productivity
are picked up. It was, for example, the potato and sweet potato that then
started Ireland and China on the road to progressive population increase.
In modern times one of the easiest things to pick up and to diffuse in a
society is knowledge of the tricks of public health, which is likely to
drive down the death rate more rapidly than output is increased in the
preconditions stage.
And so you begin, in the early stages of growth, by acquiring some
modern techniques which begin to set the society into motion on the
population side and on the side of agricultural output. Then (or perhaps
silultaneously), as contact with the outside world widens and the urban
centers grow, you begin to get enclaves of modern economic activity, often
associated with expanded domestic and foreign trade. In Japan before the
Meiji rentoration [1868] the growth of population led to the development
of a national grain market; and there emerged a whole group of merchants
oriented towards national.rather than local economic activity. During
this precondition stage some manufacturing by modern methods is likely
to develop as well. But the society remains basically agricultural and
remains structured around the old stable agricultural system. There are
enclaves of modern activity in trade, banking, and a little industry;
but these enclaves are not sufficient to set in motion a self-reinforcing
process: economic, social, or political. I should think we might describe
contemporary Indonesia and perhaps even Pakistan as in this preconditions
stage, where you have still fundamentally an old agrarian structure, influenced
it many points by modern economic activity but where there is still no
really powerful momentum towards modernization.
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Now historically there comes a moment in this sequence, after the
preconditions are gradually built up, when something hits the society
which transforms these limited, damped modern economic activities into a
self-reinforcing growth process, and the take-off begins. What kind of
things have triggered take-offs? Sometimes they have been triggered by
a straight economic process. The first of the industrial revolutions
(that is, in Britain late in the eighteenth century) was triggered by
the simultaneous coming into effect of three or, perhaps, four inventions:
the fallimgin of Arkwright's spinning patent; Watt's creation of an
efficient steam engine; the definitive solution to the problem of using
coke to make iron; and then Eli Whitney threw in the clincher with the
cotton gin, guaranteeing a cheap abundant supply of raw cotton. In
Britain there was, of course, a societal environment well geared to
modern economic activity, all set to absorb these inventions. And leaning
heavily on the new factory cotton textile industry, away they went.
The American take-off (1840-60) was also triggered by economin everts.
First, in the 1840's, the railway net was developed in the East. By the
end of the decade a shortage of food in Europe emerged. This led directly
to the building of the railway net out as far as Wisconsin and Minnesota,
to exploit- the profitability of the Midwestern wheat lands on the world
market. The creation of the tremendous rail network in the 1850's, in
its direct and indirect consequences, pushed the United States into
sustained industrial growth. The Russian take-off is, incidentally,
very much like the American. It was triggered in the 1890's once again
by a world wheat shortage .which made it profitable to run the Russian
railway system into the Ukraine to get the what out to favorable Western
European markets. The building and maintenance of a national railway
system helped to stimulate the building of a Russian heavy industry base.
The availability of new grain exports helped to stimulate the building
of a Russian heavy industry base. The availability of new grain exports
helped finance heavy imports of foreign capital.
There are some take-offs which have been triggered by political rather
than economic events. The Japanese take-off is a classic example; and
we are now observing such cases in India and China, where new governments
come in representing aspirations different from those in the past, including
among their aspirations economic growth. If the preconditions are roughly
prepared, they can launch, from a governmental base, a self-sustaining
growth process. There are -such cases even in Western Europe. It was the
revolutions of 1848--the new kinds of men and social groups that came
into power, and the energies that were released--that really sent France
and Germany into their take-offs.
5.
In short, a take-off can be started either from the side of political
or social change or from some radical economic development. I bebleve it
possible to date these take-off periods with reasonable precision for most
growing economies in the world. They generally last about twenty years.
Why twenty years? Well, before one can be sure an econommy has taken off
and is not merely enjoying a kind of one-shot spurt in economic activity,
it mst demonstrate that it can undergo successfully a massive structural
change and still maintain momentum. Take, for example, the United States
in the 1840's and '50's. The 1840's saw a great railway and public
utilities development along the Eastern seaboard. That worked itself out
in the crisis of 1847 and was followed by depression. In the 1850's,
however, the United States demonstrated that it had a sufficient pool of
entrepreneurial skill, it had sufficiently mature instruments for capital
formation, a sufficiently skilled and motivated working force to shift
the whole direction of its development successfully away from the Eastern
seaboard out to the West. This ability to adjust to changing circumstances--
to shift the direction and character of enterprise and capital formation--
is the touchstone of growth and the take-off. Earlier in our history--
roughly from Jefferson's Embargo to 1815--we had enjoyed a spurt of indus-
trial activity, just as many Latin American countries have had one-shot
spurts before they began to take-off. But in 1815 the American economy
did not have the resilience in its industrial sector to survive the shock
of the return of British imports. We lapsed back to our status as a
predominantly agricultural society. To 'prove that you've really taken off
and that it 's not just a one-shot spurt you must demonstrate that you
can make these structural adjustments; that's what a take-off does; and
that has taken about twenty years, in the historical cases available.
Now, after the take-off, in economists' language, what has happened
is that the society has built into its fabric a sufficiently high level of
investment and a sufficiently high productivity for that investment (which
means a large pool of able entrepreneurs) so that, as a normal proposition,
its economy is growing; that is, it yields a regular increase in output
substantially higher than its regular increase in population.
With the kind of population increases that one normally observes in
an underdeveloped area, this means that the rate of productive investment
must be round about 10 per cent of net national product or national income.
Once this happens to a society it has growth built into it . This doesn't
mean that its troubles are at an end--its troubles are endless--but that
an increase in output per head is one of its built-in characteristics, and
its economic problems tend to be those of structural adjustment or unem-
ployment or balance of payments (which is another kind of structural problem)
But in any case, it's over the hump into sustained growth.
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Now against the background of preconditions, the take-off, and
growth, let's turn to the political process that has tended to accompany
these economic stages.
For certain countries--we might call them the lucky countries of the
world--there has not been any great political change required to move from
the stage of preconditions to growth; although I will modify that observa-
tion in a moment. Nevertheless, it is true that eighteenth century Britain
was a society geared up in such a way that it could smoothly move into
industrial growth. There was, of couse, the Reform Bill crisis of 1832,
stemming from the rise of the industrial middle class, and the Corn Law
crisis in 1846; and then, later, the crises which gave the vote to the
industrial working class and to agricultural workers. Finally, just
before the First World War, came probably the most revolutionary of them
all: the acceptance of the progressive income tax. But from 1783 to 1914
this was an on-going political and social system that did not require
violent change either to permit growth process to get going or to deal
with the subsequent social and political problems that the growth process
helped to generate. Canada belongs in this group. Sweden belongs in it,
and the United States as well; although we should remember that part of
the structural process of our political and social change took place through
a bloody civil war. But despite the fact that the transition into indus-
trial growth in Canada involved a new constitutional structure, in Britain
required a series of important political crises, and in the United States
yielded a civil war, when we talk about the underdeveloped areas we are
considering political and social problems of a different order than those
faced in the lucky countries which had a long pre-industrial history of
Anglo-Saxon (Scandinavian or Teutonic) law, values, and politics.
The more usual case in the contemporary world, and the more difficult
case, is that of the traditional, static society that is undergoing the
preconditions into growth. What is the essential thing that happens politically
when this society begins to move out of the traditional structure into
the precondition stage? What happens is that it tends to become, for the
first time,. a meaningful nation. Nationalism, historically, as well as on
the contemporary scene, is the most usual political force and human moti-
vation which lies behind the surge into economic development.
In the precondition stage, then, a regionally based society and politics,
centered in agriculture, transforms iftself into a meaningful national unit.
The patterns by which this has happened vary a good deal. We have Bismarck
in Germany';the Meiji restoration in Japan; the tormented modern experience
of China; and in Turkey we have seen Ataturk engineer one of the most
interesting of these transitions.
7In substance the task of creating a nation consists in rallying and
organizing the various (otherwise quite possibly discordant) interests
which for one reason or another oppose the old regional structure and
wish to supplant it with a modern national organization. This requires
that the groups with vested interests in the old regional structure, often
associated with feudal land tenure, be defeated or won over. Bismarck,
as you know, built German unity on a curious alliance between the indus-
trialists of the West and the Prussian landholders in the East . The
Japanese alliance that made the Meiji restoration was an odd grouping of
clans which had been left out of power in the Tokagawa era-grain merc- 3
and samurai . The political leaders in the precondition phase tend to 1.
strong men capable of rallying around themselves all the diverse, clashing,
ill-formed forces which want a nation rather than a continuation of the
old regional structure. It is because their political base is so ill-
formed and ad hoc that charismatic leaders--as the behavioral scientists
say--tend to turn up. Efective leadership in these chaotic circumstances
often requires men who, in their person, seem to incorporate transcendent
values and objectives .around which orderly, stable political groups
have not yet been organized. History and the contemporary scene afford
a considerable list -of these characters: from Bismarck and Ataturk down
to Chiang Kai-shek, Peron, Nehru, Magsaysay, and Nasser. They have been
men of the transition, helping to create, more or less successfully, the
conditions for a modern unified nation and a growing economy.
Now, if the American national objective in these transitional areas
is long-run economic growth and an unfo:lding, reasonably stable development
of democratic political and social processes, what is it that we want from
these leaders?
As I said earlier, their great motivating force isusually nationalism;
and their first job, in a sense, is to consolidate effectively their politi-
cal power and the new institutions of a national state. Inevitably this
must divert a portion of their energies. But there is likely to be a
further claim on them. Almost without exception when nations are formed.
from old regional units, or out of a colonial administration, they have
suffered some national indignity; and as the new nation forms up, it
immediately finds on its agenda some external goal or ambition the achievement
of which represents the successful assertion of status on the world scene.
Germany, when it was formed up, keenly aware that it had arrived late,
immediately began to see all kinds of angles to play in both Eastern and
Western Europe as well as in Africa and the Middle East. The Japanese,
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when they had consolidated at home and looked around in the 18901s,
immediately could see all kinds of adventurous possibilities on the Asian
mainland. Ataturk had to deal with an accumulation of bad memories and
had-aspirations, notably in relation to Greece. Pakistan and India have
Kashmir; Indonesia, West Irian; while Nasser has the Canal, Israel, and
an Arab empire as the gleam in his eye. And so you are likely to have
this problem: to what extent shall this newly organized nationalism
channel off its energies, talents, and resources into external adventure
or the redress of believed ancient wrongs.
The third channel for the new nation's energies is, of course, the
economic and social modernization of the domestic society.
Out of the transition, then, emerges a leader, or a group of leaders,
who harness the new national energy and ambition to some mixture of these
three goals: domestic political consolidation, external adventure, - and
economic and social modernization. And my fundamental proposition is
that the outcome, in terms of both the economic and political processes,
depends on the balance and proportion in which the leadership pursues these
three possible objectives. If they are kept in balance, and especially If
adequate energies, talents, and resourcies are thrown into the modernization
of the economy, you have a chance of setting in motion an on-going economic,
social, and political process which is reasonably stable and benign for
the world outside. This was the aclevement of Ataturk and it is the promise
of Nehru.
If the leadership dissipates--or is forced by circumstances to
dissipate--its energies, talents, and resources on the lrst and second
tasks--of internal and external power--there is trouble at home and trouble
for the world at large. Chiang Kai-shek, for example, caught up in incredibly
difficult circumstances after 1927, set his heart on domestic political
consolidation as a prior objective to economic, social, and political
modernization in China; and he helped bring about his downfall by this lack
of balance. Rhee is focussed disproportionately on his enemies to the north.
Diem has been forced to devote his first two years to political consolidation
at the expense of domestic economic and social progress. Nasser is strikingly
out of balance in pursuit of external power. And so on.
The major gap in Millikan's and my analysis, then, is that we did not
address ourselves to the problem of these intermediary transitional figures
who play such a large part in contemporary foreign policy. In short, we
did not deal with the politics of the preconditions period.
From the view presented today emerges the formal propodtion that
economic progress and political stability require that the raw energies
released in the preconditions period be harnessed, in decent proportions,
to the constructive domestic tasks of modernization and that they not be
dissipated in the consolidation or pursuit of domestic or foreign power.
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If this proposition is correct, how does it bear on the American
national interest and on U.S. policy? Briefly, it is our interest to see
the powerful nationalism at work in the world turned, in substantial degree,
to domestic tasks of modernization by progressively more democratic
processes; that adequate resources and energies also be devoted to the
maintenance of strength against external aggression; and that the pursuit
of power abroad by means of force be minimized. The appropriate balance
will vary, of course, from case to case and from time to time. But if some
such disposition represents the broad American interest what can we do
about it? Essentially there are three things we can and should do.
The first thing to do is to make the external military exrpession of
nationalism as unattractive as possible. This requires something more in
our national policy than the sending of cautionary cables from time to
time or even the maintenance of vast strength in nuclear weapons. It
requires both the existence in being of an American military force capable
of conducting limited warfare and the evident will of the United States
to use it if it is required to keep some order in the world.'
The existence of such a force and such a doctrine would not encourage
new Koreas. The lesson for limited war is the general lesson about
war: you minimize the chance of having war if you are prepared in fact
and in spirit. Over the indefinite future even in a world where atomic
weapons have been put under effective international control we shall need
some form of limited force and the evident will to use it, either unilaterally
or through the United Nations to make sure, in this world of rising expec-
tations, where some fellows from time to time are bound to have hop-headed
dreams, that the rules are kept. So an effective deterent is the first
requirement. This doesn't mean that we want to frustrate the rise of the
new nations to positions of increasing responsibility and authority on
the world scene. It does mean that we want to discourage a disproportionate
effort to enlarge their area of control and, especially, to make as unattrac-
tive a possible the external expression of their nationalism by military
methods.
The second task is to make as attractive as possible the channelling
off of their energies into economic and social growth and, generally, into
the modernization of their societies by the techniques of consent. We
require a powerful incentive, sufficiently attractive to draw men towards
the difficult homely tasks of economic development. It is, essentially,
the nature of the carrot which is described in our economic foreign policy
memorandum.
Third, we must use our direct and indirect influence in these societies--
such as it may be--to help encourage the rise of men who have the insights
and capabilities to lead their people not only in self-reinforcing economic
growth but in the development of democratic social and political instttutions.
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There is no point in evading the fact that these three propositions
involve an attempt to interfere in the evolution of other societies.
But, given American power, interference is unavoidable. We are interfering
all the time, whether we act or fail to act. We interfere if we have an
aid program in South Korea; we interfere if we don't have an aid program
in South Korea. Ai so on down the line. The task of American policy is
not to delude yourself that we are, in fact, respecting other people's
sovereignty. In a world as intimately interacting as ours you cannot
respect sovereignty in the old purist sense, notably if you are the major
power. Our task is to make sure our limited--but real and unavoidable--
margin of influence is well and effectively used.
The line of thought I have presented to you today is extremely pre-
liminary and tentative. The rather primitive logical chain I'have
sketched in begins with the notion that in the precondition: stage of
economic growth you are moving out of the traditional society and its
politics and releasing and mobilizing nationalist forces and sentiments.
This nationalism can take a variety of forms, of which I focussed on
three: domestic consolidation, external aggression, and modernization.
If societies going through this transition are to be both tolerably stable
and progressive more democratic, a high portion of the nationalist energy
has to be channelled into domestic constructive tasks . Some of the men
who have come to power in these transitional circumstances have built
into them--into their sense of the situation and their abitions--a remarkable
sense of balance. Some of them have not. Many of our difficulties arise
from those political leaders in the precondition stage who don't have a
balanced sense of direction, who lack the will and purpose and the ability
to use the nationalist sentiment which supports them for purposes of
domestic modernization--economic and otherwise.
Under these circumstances the task of American policy is to use such
influence as we have on the evolution of those societies to help_ fulfill
the conditions for relatively stable concurrent economic and political
development: first, by making the external violent expression of nationalism
unattractive; second, by setting up very powerful incentives for the channelling
of this nationalist sentiment into constructive economic and other tasks;
and third, to assist, where we can, the rise of men who will take the third
outlet for nationalism as a major, if not a primary, goal.
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Now, finally, what does this view have to say about the relation
between economic and political development and policy? Is an economic
policy capable of producing the political results we want? Or is the
right political setting required to produce the economic result we want?
My answer is that both propositions are true. A take-off is impossible
unless a reasonably satisfactory political setting for it has already been
established. A condition for take-off is the prior creation of a political
system in which a sufficient proportion of the new nation's energies, talents,
and resources are channelled into the task of modernizing the economy to
complete the technical conditions demanded by the precondition stage and
to launch (or accept) the impulses leading to takedff. Once a take-off
starts, however, successful economic development can powerfully carry
forward the process of political and social development, producing new
leaders, attitudes, confidence, and many of the conditions required for
long-run political viability.
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